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ABSTRACT: Despite considerable evidence that police legitimacy results in beneficial
outcomes like compliance, cooperation, and empowerment, scholars have yet to agree on how to
define and operationalize legitimacy. Drawing on Max Weber’s facets of legitimacy, we
developed and tested a measure of “traditional authority,” reflecting the possibility that some
people legitimate the police more so based on tradition than normative concerns regarding
fairness. Confirmatory factor analysis of survey data from a national sample of 701 US adults
revealed that our traditional authority items loaded separately from items commonly used to
capture feelings of trust, obligation to obey, and moral alignment. Furthermore, although
perceived legitimacy appears to flow from perceptions of procedural and distributive fairness
regardless of how it is measured, traditional authority is more strongly associated with
empowerment of the police. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these
findings and urge researchers to replicate and extend our work.
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There is strong agreement among police, policing scholars, activists, and reformers that in
democratic societies the institution of policing must be viewed as legitimate by citizens in order to
maximize social control (President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, 2015; Tyler, 2004,
2006b). People who view the police as legitimate feel a moral obligation to obey the law, and as a
result are more likely to comply with officers (Reisig et al., 2018; Walters & Bolger, 2019) and
engage with the criminal justice system by reporting crimes or testifying as witnesses (Mazerolle
et al., 2013; Murphy et al., 2008). They may even be more willing to empower the police to
investigate and control crime through invasive, coercive, and/or legally precarious tactics (Fox et
al., 2020; Moule, Fox, et al., 2019; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). This legitimating process takes the
form of an ongoing dialogue between police and the communities they serve (Bottoms & Tankebe,
2012), wherein police continually enhance or diminish their legitimacy on the basis of their actions
(Oliveira et al., Forthcoming). Indeed, the killing of George Floyd by Minneapolis police officers
in May 2020 reignited national debate about the appropriate role of the police and the authority
and responsibilities they should be given. Some citizens want the police to be “abolished” (Vitale,
2017), some advocate defunding and reimagining the police (Fernandez, 2020), and still others
have rallied to support expanded police powers under the slogan “Back the Blue” (Nagy, 2020).
These characterizations of the appropriate role of police are likely linked to these individuals’
assessments of the legitimacy of the police, with individuals that “Back the Blue” granting high
legitimacy and individuals seeking to defund or abolish the police granting low legitimacy to the
institution of the police.
Despite its established importance, social scientists have yet to reach consensus on how to
define the “abstract and unobservable psychological construct” of legitimacy (Jackson & Bradford
2019, p. 22-23). Throughout the extant literature, terms such as rightful or proper (Zelditch, 2006),
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consent (Beetham, 2013; Coicaud, 2002), obligation to obey (Tyler, 2003, 2006b), moral
alignment or shared values (Beetham, 2013; Jackson et al., 2012), lawfulness, fairness, and
effectiveness (Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012; Tankebe, 2013) have all been used to characterize
legitimate authority. Still, while there is considerable variation in conceptualization and
operationalization, the majority of studies have focused on the sources and outcomes of a specific
type of legitimate power that Max Weber (1947) called “legal-rational authority,” or legitimation
based on the legality and fair use of power. But Weber noted that authorities can also be granted
legitimacy based on established tradition. Traditional legitimacy is “based on a long standing
custom” of an authority holding power (Alpert & Dunham 2004, p. 177) and – to the extent citizens
legitimate the police in this way – may involve different policy implications. In the United States,
where formal policing has been present in many localities since the mid-1800s, many citizens may
comply, cooperate, or even empower the police to fight crime just because they are the police,
regardless of perceived fairness or moral alignment. Put simply, the established tradition of police
presence may amount to legitimacy for at least some portion of the population independent of the
fairness with which officers exercise their legal authority.
In this study, we draw on Weber’s concept of traditional authority to develop a new
conceptualization of police legitimacy that takes into account important dimensions of police
legitimacy not yet considered in the criminological literature. In developing this conceptualization
we consider (1) whether there are different forms of legitimacy, (2) whether the sources of
legitimacy vary by type, and (3) whether different forms of legitimacy have different impacts on
outcomes of legitimacy, such as empowerment of the police. Using survey data collected in the
summer of 2019, we propose a measure of traditional authority and consider its implications for
the study of police legitimacy. We first examine whether survey items we developed to tap
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“traditional authority” differ meaningfully from those often used to assess “legal-rational
authority.” We then assess whether our traditional authority construct results in meaningful
differences when analyzing the consequences of legitimacy, using empowerment as an example.
Specifically, we consider whether the measures of legitimacy relate differently to global
empowerment as well as situational empowerment of the police to investigate a hypothetical
officer-involved shooting incident. This work allows us to provide a more well-rounded
understanding of police legitimacy that offers nuance in the differences in perceptions that citizens
might have of the police.
Conceptualizing Legitimacy
“Social scientists have in fact been thoroughly confused about legitimacy, and their confusion
has its starting point in their failure to conceptualise it adequately.”
Beetham, 2013, p. 7
Legitimacy is, and has always been, challenging to define conceptually. Weber’s initial,
somewhat tautological, description of legitimacy is that it is simply the belief that power is
legitimate (Beetham, 2013; Weber, 1947). Weber continues with his conceptualization of
legitimacy by describing legitimacy as a normative belief that an authority is entitled to be obeyed
- an argument that has continued in modern criminological research on legitimacy (Weber, 1947).
Since obedience – or compliance – is an outcome of critical importance to criminal justice scholars,
this results in a situation where legitimacy is defined by its outcome. 1 To avoid this issue, social
psychologists have traditionally considered legitimacy to be the belief that an authority’s claim to
power is right or proper (Zelditch, 2006). In this vein, Tyler (2006a, p. 375) defines legitimacy as
“a psychological property of an authority, institution, or social arrangement that leads those
connected to it to believe that it is appropriate, proper, and just.” Beetham (2013, p. 3) takes a
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This approach of defining legitimacy by one of its outcomes is one of the primary critiques of the legitimacy
literature discussed by Tankebe (2013).
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slightly different position, claiming “where power is acquired and exercised according to
justifiable rules, and with evidence of consent, we call it rightful or legitimate.” Critically, this
means that Beetham’s definition differs from the social psychological definitions, given its
stipulation that power be exercised in a manner considered to be procedurally fair and with the
consent of those subjected to it. Beetham goes on to identify various types of legitimacy, including
legal validity (i.e., that legitimacy is predicated on an exercise of power consistent with established
laws) and moral justifiability (i.e., that legitimacy is granted to authorities who wield their power
in a way that is consistent with the moral principles of the group or society). In sum, while
researchers often treat legitimacy as a concept with a single definition, throughout history theorists
have proffered definitions with key distinctions.
These notable differences are undoubtedly why criminologists continue to debate the
proper conceptualization of legitimacy (see e.g., Jackson & Bradford 2019; Posch, Jackson,
Bradford, & MacQueen 2019; Tankebe 2013). Tyler’s (2006a) definition of a belief that an
authority is right or proper is consistent with other social psychological definitions (e.g., Zelditch,
2006). Huq, Jackson, and Trinkner’s (2017) conceptualization of legitimacy as a normative
alignment with police is similar to Beetham’s discussion of moral justifiability. Finally, Tankebe’s
(2013) approach of defining legitimacy according to concepts many others consider its antecedents
(e.g., procedural and distributive justice) aligns with Beetham’s (2013) contention that legitimacy
be exercised according to justifiable rules. Clearly, more work is needed to continue pushing
forward our collective thinking on what “legitimacy” means in the criminal justice context.
One way to advance legitimacy theoretically is to acknowledge that legitimacy and
legitimation may not be a singular construct. That is, for some individuals legitimation may occur
through a fair process, moral alignment, or other means. To consider this possibility, we return to
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Weber’s (1947) initial arguments about legitimacy. Specifically, Weber notes that legitimacy can
be split into three facets – rational, traditional, and charismatic – based on how an authority is
granted its legitimacy. Rational legitimacy is granted to an authority when it acts within the bounds
of legally prescribed procedures. Traditional legitimacy is granted simply because an authority has
always possessed power. Charismatic legitimacy is granted to an authority figure whose
personality is appealing. There are arguably some examples of charismatic legitimacy in policing
(e.g., Sheriff Joe Arpaio, Sheriff David Clarke, Jr.), but the concept predominately applies to the
leaders themselves (e.g., sheriffs) rather than institutions (e.g., policing). Accordingly, we will not
discuss it further – though future research exploring the possibility of charismatic legitimacy being
granted to popularly elected sheriffs would be a welcomed addition to the literature. Rational
legitimacy and traditional legitimacy are discussed in greater detail below.2
Rational Legitimacy
Rational legitimacy is defined by Weber (1947, p. 328) as “resting on a belief in the
‘legality’ of patterns of normative rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such
rules to issue commands.” Weber deems an institution receiving legitimacy on this basis to be a
“legal authority.” Importantly, the rational basis for legitimacy is clearly reflected in works on
legitimacy in criminal justice. Tyler (2006b) specifically deems legitimate authorities to be acting
based on normative rules. Further, being granted this authority reflects an adherence to rules – or
a process. It is foundational to theories of legitimacy in criminal justice that legitimacy be granted
based on a fair process. Thus, to the extent that the legal rules of Weber are perceived as fair by
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To be clear, our purpose here is not to pick a side in the debate over how best to measure rational authority.
Instead, we argue it is necessary to take a step back and consider Weber’s point that rational authority is but one of
at least three facets of legitimacy that people grant authorities.
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individuals, the theories of Weber and Tyler are consistent. Beetham (2013) also joins this
consensus as his definition of legitimacy is contingent upon the use of justifiable rules.
Weber differs from Tyler, however, in explicitly referencing the limited nature of the power
granted to legal authorities. Specifically, Weber (1947, p. 328, emphasis ours) notes that
“obedience is owed to the legally established impersonal order. It extends to the persons exercising
the authority of office under it only by virtue of the formal legality of their commands.” Thus,
when legitimacy is granted on a rational basis, if the agency or one of its representatives violates
the legality on which their authority is based, obedience is not guaranteed. Practically, this suggests
that an individual who receives an unlawful order from a police officer would not obey the
command just because the police are granted legal authority.3 Thus, rational-legal legitimacy has
a bounded relationship with the traditional criminological outcomes of legitimacy. Greater
legitimacy leads to an increased likelihood of compliance, cooperation, or empowerment, provided
the authority’s behavior is within the bounds of the law.
Traditional Legitimacy
Weber’s (1947, p. 328) traditional legitimacy rests “on an established belief in the sanctity
of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of the status of those exercising authority under them.”
Individuals and agencies granted legitimacy on this basis are simply called “traditional
authorities.” In the realm of criminal justice, this can most obviously be seen as a loyalty to the
institution of policing – or as it has been recently referred to, “back the blue.” In other words, the
police are legitimate simply because they are the police. Police departments have been operating
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Note that an unlawful order is critically different from measures of legitimacy that state an individual should do
what the police say even if they disagree (Hinds & Murphy, 2007; Jackson et al., 2012). Disagreement is a reflection
that the tactic is not what the individual would want, not a statement that the tactic is not within the procedural
authority of the official. For example, rational legitimacy would suggest that an individual could think that police
officers should not arrest individuals for possession of marijuana but still recognize that it is within their legally
prescribed authority to do so and feel obligated to comply. By contrast, an individual employing rational legitimacy
would not necessarily comply with a search that the officer did not have legal authority to conduct.
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in many U.S. jurisdictions for well over 100 years now. As such, some individuals need not
legitimate the authority of the police based on established rules, and instead grant legitimacy based
on the well-established and time-honored position of authority. From a theoretical standpoint, this
is evident in the burgeoning literature on legal socialization, which has established a link between
parental evaluations of criminal justice system legitimacy and children’s evaluations of said
legitimacy (Cavanagh & Cauffman, 2015; McLean et al., 2019; Tyler & Trinkner, 2017; Wolfe et
al., 2017). This link shows that police legitimacy can be something passed down from one
generation to the next, rather than granted through procedural means.
The critical result of granting police legitimacy based on tradition rather than rational or
legal grounds is that the bounds of their authority are expanded. Officers need not restrict
themselves to the bounds of the law, but instead continue to garner the benefits of legitimacy so
long as they are acting as police officers. Colloquially, consider that many individuals who “back
the blue” respond to incidents of questionable uses of force by saying things such as, “I don’t care
who you are or what has happened, if the police order you to do something, you do it.” Such a
statement explicitly refutes the need for officers to act within legal expectations and, instead,
insists on obedience on the basis that the authority is a police officer. Consider also this headline
from The Washington Post, written days after the infamous shooting of Michael Brown in
Ferguson, MO: “I’m a cop. If you don’t want to get hurt, don’t challenge me” (Dutta, 2014).
Reconciling Traditional Legitimacy with Existing Research
Drawing primarily from the definitions of legitimacy identified by Tyler (2006b), but also
Beetham (2013) and others (Weber, 1947; Zelditch, 2006), scholars have reached considerable
consensus in describing the benefits of legitimacy. From Weber to Beetham to Tyler, legitimacy
is important because it generates compliance and cooperation (Beetham, 2013; Tyler, 2006b;
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Weber, 1947; Zelditch, 2006). In the realm of criminal justice, scholars have particularly focused
on the potential for legitimacy to increase compliance and cooperation with the police (Hough et
al., 2010; Metcalfe et al., 2016; Reisig et al., 2007, 2012; Reisig & Lloyd, 2009; Tankebe, 2013;
Tyler & Fagan, 2008). Thus, police legitimacy has played a critical role in calls for police reform
as a promising avenue for improving community-relations and reducing the use of force through
the promotion of voluntary compliance (President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, 2015;
cf. Nagin & Telep, 2017; Worden &, McLean, 2017).
It stands to reason then, that one may question the utility of further fracturing the
conceptualization of legitimacy. However, it is worth noting that criminal justice scholars have
already begun to question whether current operationalizations of legitimacy represent ‘truly free
consent’ (see e.g., Posch et al., 2019). For example, an item on Moule and colleagues’ (2019) trust
in police scale states, “I respect the police and their authority.” This operationalization, in our
opinion, undoubtedly taps into an individual’s assessment of police legitimacy, but is incapable of
distinguishing the type of legitimacy being granted. In other words, both an individual who
respects the police because it is tradition and an individual who respects the police because they
operate within their legally prescribed bounds would respond positively to the item. This suggests
that researchers should consider whether (and which) type of legitimacy matters for their research
question when operationalizing legitimacy. To illustrate, we now turn to a discussion of
empowerment, an outcome that requires understanding the type of legitimacy granted.
Empowering the Police: An Example of Competing Propositions
In addition to compliance and cooperation, Sunshine and Tyler (2003) argued that
perceptions of police legitimacy increase public support for police empowerment. That is,
individuals who believe the police are legitimate will support “policies that empower police to use
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greater discretion in enforcing the law” (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003, p. 514). Research testing
Sunshine and Tyler’s empowerment hypothesis is still in its infancy, but has generally supported
the argument, demonstrating a positive relationship between perceived legitimacy and willingness
to empower the police (Gerber & Jackson, 2017; Metcalfe & Hodge, 2018; Moule, Burruss, et al.,
2019; Moule, Fox, et al., 2019). Yet, the empowerment hypothesis does present some challenges.
In particular, the empowerment hypothesis states only that individuals will grant more
discretion to the police when they believe police are more legitimate. Greater discretion necessarily
includes the possibility of police overstepping their procedurally designated authority. 4 Some
conceptualizations of legitimacy argue that violations of these procedures and overstepping of
prescribed authority will decrease legitimacy (e.g., Beetham, 2013). Consider, for example,
practices like stop, question and frisk (SQF). The empowerment hypothesis suggests that greater
legitimacy should grant officers greater discretion in using stop and frisk. However, many citizens
believe SQF is used in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner (White & Fradella, 2019). To the
extent that individuals believe that SQF is discriminatory, procedural justice theory suggests that
its use will decrease police legitimacy. In other words, a feedback loop is generated where greater
perceptions of legitimacy lead to an increase in empowerment to SQF, but its increased usage leads
to negative perceptions of procedural justice and a decrease in legitimacy (see Figure 1). As can
be seen in the figure, something must be missing from this model for individuals to continue to
grant police legitimacy and empower them to engage in SQF.
[Insert Figure 1 About Here]

4

This is not to suggest that all discretionary behaviors are problematic. Some, such as using discretion to generate
fewer arrests and divert individuals in need to appropriate resources may, in fact, be viewed positively. However, the
broader point is that with greater discretion comes greater opportunity for unfair treatment.
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Similarly, critics have argued that police reforms centered on increasing procedural justice
make people “feel better” about the police without actually addressing flawed policing practices
(Cobbina & Vitale, 2021; see also Worden & McLean, 2017). To the extent that increasing
procedural fairness and legitimacy results in individuals feeling better about behaviors that
overstep the bounds of police authority, these practices may be counterproductive to the goal of
improving policing. Remember, though, the bounded relationship between legitimacy and its
outcomes when using Weber’s facets of legitimacy. If an individual legitimates the authority
through legal-rational means and a criminal justice official or agency seeks empowerment to
engage in behaviors beyond the scope of their legally prescribed authority, legitimacy will not be
granted.5 Thus, we propose a bounded empowerment hypothesis, that individuals granting the
police legitimacy as a legal authority will not empower them to engage in behaviors that overstep
the bounds of the legal process on which the authority was granted. On the other hand, when an
individual legitimates the authority through traditional means, an unbounded relationship exists.
That is, they will empower the police to engage in behaviors that overstep the bounds of the legal
process on which the authority was granted.
In sum, the empowerment hypothesis provides an opportunity to examine why
acknowledging various facets of legitimacy is so crucial. More than developing a clearer
understanding of the theoretical underpinnings of legitimacy, the type of legitimacy granted may
be directly related to the relationships legitimacy has with important outcomes. While striving to
maximize outcomes such as cooperation or compliance ad infinitum seems unproblematic on its
face, empowering the police to the point they engage in harmful behaviors is of critical concern.

5

Note that other research has found respect for the boundaries of their legal authority to be an important predictor of
police legitimacy (Huq et al., 2017; Trinkner et al., 2018). This is consistent with the bounded empowerment
hypothesis, but distinct in using bounds to predict legitimacy rather than limiting empowerment.
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As a result, understanding the bounded nature of legitimacy should be considered a priority for
understanding the consequences of the theoretical construct.
Current Study
Having theoretically justified the conceptualization of different facets of legitimacy, we
now turn to the empirical implications of this construct. To establish the relevance of traditional
legitimacy empirically, we:
1. Assess the measurement structure of public perceptions of rational-legal and traditional
police legitimacy scales based on previously used measures – trust in the police, obligation
to obey, and normative alignment – as well as several items intended to tap into evaluations
of traditional legitimacy.
2. Examine whether these measures differ in their antecedents (e.g., procedural justice,
distributive justice).
3. Predict global empowerment of the police (i.e., general attitudes towards empowering the
police to perform their duties) and situational empowerment of the police (i.e., attitudes
regarding the empowerment of the police to perform a specific task) in a specific scenario
to determine if the basis of legitimacy matters in evaluating Sunshine and Tyler’s (2003)
empowerment hypothesis.
Methods
Data
Data for the present study come from an online survey administered to 735 U.S. adults in
the summer of 2019. The sample was obtained from a Qualtrics panel of online survey participants
and imposed quotas so that the sample would match national estimates of age, race/ethnicity, and
gender to obtain a more generalizable sample (see Table 1). Individuals entered into the survey on
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a first come-first serve basis such that data was collected on all individuals entering into the survey
until a quota was met, at which point they were removed from the survey immediately after the
demographic questions and did not see or complete any additional questions. When recruiting for
the study, no information was provided regarding the content of the study, so the decision to
participate could not be based on any factors related to the study content. Using these criteria, 735
participants completed the survey, with 701 providing complete data (i.e., no missing cells). Given
the small amount of missing data (<5%), we used listwise deletion.
[Insert Table 1 Here]
The survey began with a series of demographic questions before asking participants a
variety of questions regarding their perceptions of policing – including procedural justice,
distributive justice, police effectiveness, and police legitimacy (discussed in more detail below).
Participants were then asked questions about their general willingness to empower the police.
Next, to examine how different measures of legitimacy operate in an applied scenario, participants
read a series of mock tweets and a brief news article about a hypothetical police shooting.6 Of
particular interest to the present study, after reading about the police shooting, participants
answered a series of questions about their willingness to empower the police to conduct an internal
investigation. While police departments are often legally authorized to investigate their own, best
practices recommendations from organizations such as the President’s Task Force on 21st Century
Policing (2015) and the Major Cities Chiefs of Police Association (Kuhns et al., 2018) advocate
shifting to external investigations of police shootings. Accordingly, the bounds of police authority
are strained when investigating their own after a shooting. Thus, to the extent that rational

6

Full text of the mock tweets and news article is available in the Supplemental Online Materials. Note that although
respondents were randomly assigned to 1 of 4 treatment conditions, the conditions are not the focus of this analysis
and are not utilized to test any of the hypotheses related to the measurement of legitimacy.
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legitimacy does not support empowering the police to engage in questionable behaviors, we expect
these measures to have a weaker association with empowerment in the hypothetical scenario.
Measures
Legitimacy. To examine the key construct in a manner that was both reflective of prior
literature and incorporated the proposed construct of traditional authority, items representing four
previous subconstructs of legitimacy were utilized. Trust in the police contained three items
intended to tap into individuals’ perceptions of the trustworthiness of the police (e.g., “The police
in my community care about the people in my community,” adapted from McLean, 2019).
Obligation to obey consisted of three items assessing individuals’ perceived obligation to obey
police orders (e.g., “You should do what the police tell you even if you do not understand or agree
with the reasons,” adapted from Jackson et al., 2012). Normative alignment contained three items
intended to measure the degree to which individuals believed that police values are consistent with
their own (e.g., “The police in my community act in ways consistent with my own moral values,”
adapted from Jackson et al., 2012). Finally, traditional authority was comprised of four items
intended to assess support for the police due solely to their status as police, consistent with Weber’s
arguments (e.g., “It is difficult to imagine a situation where I would not support the actions of a
police officer”).7 Responses to these statements and all others ranged from 1 (Strongly Disagree)
to 5 (Strongly Agree) and were combined using factor scores produced from a confirmatory factor
analysis (discussed in the analytic strategy section).8
Empowerment. Empowerment was assessed in two ways. First, a measure of global
empowerment contained five statements regarding respondents’ willingness to empower the police

7

A full list of all items included in the study is available in the Supplemental Online Materials.
Note that descriptive statistics are not provided for these measures as they are factor scores which, by definition,
are standardized with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.
8
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to perform their general duties (e.g., “The police should have the power to do whatever they think
is necessary to fight crime,” adapted from Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Second, after reading a series
of mock tweets and a news article about a police shooting (discussed above), individuals were
asked about their willingness to empower the police in that specific context (OIS empowerment).
This measure consisted of three items regarding each respondent’s willingness to empower the
police to conduct the investigation into the shooting (e.g., “There is little reason to be concerned
about this incident before the investigation is completed”).
Antecedents. Consistent with prior research, the antecedents of legitimacy are expected to
be procedural justice, distributive justice, and police effectiveness. Procedural justice was
measured with seven items assessing individuals’ perceptions of police officers’ adherence to a
fair process (e.g., “Generally speaking, the police give people a chance to tell their side of the story
before they decide what to do,” adapted from Tankebe, 2013; Tyler & Jackson, 2014). Distributive
justice was measured with three items assessing individuals’ perceptions of how police officers
distribute outcomes (e.g., “Generally speaking, the police deliver different outcomes based on
race,” reverse coded, adapted from Tyler & Wakslak, 2004). Police effectiveness was measured
with five items examining individuals’ perceptions of the effectiveness of the police in dealing
with a variety of crimes (e.g., “How well do the police do in tackling gun crime?” Responses here
ranged from 1 – Very Poor to 5 – Very Well, adapted from Tankebe, 2013).
Controls. We included in our analyses several control variables to minimize unobserved
confounder bias. Given the demonstrated importance of politics in the understanding of police
empowerment (Moule, Burruss, et al., 2019; Moule, Fox, et al., 2019) we assess political ideology
as measured by level of agreement with four statements about current political issues (e.g., “The
government should provide free health care for all”) and political identification as measured by
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two items asking individuals to self-identify their political tendencies (e.g., “On social issues, I
would describe myself as:” responses ranged from 1 – Very Liberal to 7 – Very Conservative,
adapted from Moule, Burruss, et al. 2019; Moule, Fox, et al. 2019). These measures were included
in the analyses separately as prior research indicates being symbolically liberal (self-identifying as
a liberal to an item such as is included in the identification measure) is different from being
operationally liberal (agreeing with policies that are considered liberal) – with more individuals
indicating they are operationally liberal than symbolically liberal (Ellis & Stinson, 2012).9
We also measured the respondents’ age continuously in years, self-identified gender
(male=1, female=0), race (Black=1, Hispanic=1, other=1, with white serving as the reference
category), and highest level of education (1=less than high school to 6=graduate degree). When
predicting our second outcome (OIS empowerment), binary variables for the police information
condition (police information, high=1, low=0) and presence of a witness condition (witness
present, yes=1, no=0) were included to control for the design of the experiment.
Analytic Strategy
The analysis proceeded in three phases. In the first phase, the measurement properties of
legitimacy were tested using factor analysis to accomplish the first research objective of
establishing whether a traditional authority measure differs statistically from the commonly used
legal-rational measures. The sample was randomly split in half using a random number generator
in R version 4.0.2.10 The first half of the data was used for exploratory factor analysis to propose
a factor structure for the measurement of legitimacy. This proposed factor structure was then tested
on the second half of the sample using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). Splitting the sample is

9

Variance inflation factors and conditional indices were estimated for all models and demonstrated no evidence of
multicollinearity (Belsley et al., 1980; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).
10
All factor analyses (exploratory and confirmatory) were conducted in R version 4.0.2.
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a recommended practice for conducting both exploratory and CFA within a single study (Fabrigar
et al., 1999). Additionally, all CFAs used robust maximum likelihood estimation to account for
any non-normality in the data (Finney & DiStefano, 2013). With a final model decided, CFA was
then conducted on the full data set containing all measures to ensure adequate measurement
properties of all measures involved in the study and generate factor scores for each measure to be
used in the next phases of the analyses.
The second phase examined how each dimension of legitimacy was related to the proposed
antecedents of legitimacy. That is, like prior work, ordinary least squares regression was used to
regress the dimensions of police legitimacy identified in the first phase on measures of procedural
justice, distributive justice, and police effectiveness, as well each control variable. This establishes
whether the different constructs of legitimacy are related to different antecedents than previously
established (Tankebe, 2013; Tyler, 2006b). All regressions in this phase of the analysis, as well as
the third phase, were conducted in Stata v15. We expected that this analysis would reveal that the
measures of legitimacy operate in a similar manner to each other, as they are each assessing the
same broader concept of police legitimacy.
Finally, the third phase used empowerment as an example to consider the implications of
studying different facets of legitimacy. First, OLS was used to regress a measure of global
empowerment of the police on the dimensions of police legitimacy and all variables included in
the second phase.11 Then, a measure assessing public empowerment of the police in a hypothetical
police shooting was regressed on these same measures and the two experimental manipulations
used as controls as noted above. Both regressions were conducted over two sets of models, one

11

Note that all measures are included from the second phase in an effort to be consistent with prior work on the
police empowerment hypothesis. We acknowledge that their inclusion may seem redundant given their role in the
second phase, but we believe there is value in conducting the analyses in a similar way to previous scholars who
were not considering traditional authority.
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limited to the legal-rational authority measures of legitimacy (i.e., trust and obligation to obey)
and one with the traditional authority measure of legitimacy included. This allowed us to examine
whether and how adding traditional authority as a measure of legitimacy impact analyses of
legitimacy’s outcomes.
Results
Phase 1
To begin the analysis, the properties and structure of the legitimacy measures were
assessed. As mentioned previously, the sample was split in half with the first half being subject to
exploratory factor analysis. To begin the exploratory factor analysis, parallel analysis was
conducted on all items to determine a suggested number of factors present in the data using R’s
parallel function. Parallel analysis conducts a scree plot on the observed data and compares it to a
scree plot of an equally-sized, randomly generated dataset (Horn, 1965). This eliminates the need
to interpret the bends in scree plots as all factors for which the eigenvalue of the observed data set
are greater than the eigenvalues of the simulated dataset can be considered as having covariance
beyond chance. In this case, the parallel analysis indicated three factors (see scree plot in
Supplemental Online Materials).
With a suggested number of factors proposed, principal axis factoring was conducted to
extract measurement models for one, two, three, and four factors. Multiple models were extracted
and compared to ensure that three factors was indeed the most appropriate way to measure the
concepts. The cumulative variance explained was 0.56 for the one-factor solution, 0.62 for the
two-factor solution, 0.66 for the three-factor solution, and 0.69 for the four-factor solution. This
revealed that the proportion of variance explained increased only incrementally after the addition
of the second factor. Further, in examining the factor structures (see Supplemental Online
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Materials), it was apparent that the structure followed the theorized patterns with factors consistent
with the concepts listed above – trust in the police, normative alignment, obligation to obey, and
traditional legitimacy – with two exceptions. First, in each of the factor structures it appeared that
our measure of trust in the police was tapping into the same latent construct as normative
alignment. Accordingly, we combined these measures into a single trust scale in the CFA. Second,
the first obligation to obey item created significant cross-loading issues in all multiple factor
models. In order to achieve the goal of simple structure (Gorsuch, 1983), the item was removed
from analyses in the CFA for all multiple factor models. Finally, we did not test the four-factor
model in the CFA as its factor structure is not consistent with any prior theories of legitimacy.
To confirm the best factor structure for the data, the proposed structures from the
exploratory factor analysis were imposed on the second half of the data for CFA. Despite appearing
robust in the exploratory models, the single-factor CFA did not achieve acceptable levels of fit
(CFI=0.88, TLI=0.85, RMSEA=0.13, SRMR=0.07). The two-factor model came closer but still
failed to meet traditional thresholds of fit (CFI=0.92, TLI=0.90, RMSEA=0.12, SRMR=0.06).
Finally, the three-factor model achieved acceptable fit (CFI=0.98, TLI=0.97, RMSEA=0.06,
SRMR=0.03) and was therefore deemed the appropriate measurement model for estimating factor
scores (see Figure 2). Critically, however, the three factors of legitimacy all co-vary substantially,
indicating that they are measuring the same general construct of legitimacy. In other words,
legitimacy may be most appropriately thought of as a higher-order factor that consists of several
related factors: trust, obligation to obey, and traditional authority. For statistical purposes, these
constructs should be measured independently as they are all distinct constructs (as indicated by the
fit of the CFAs), despite being conceptually linked.
[Insert Figure 2 About Here]
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Finally, an overall CFA containing all measures to be used in the study was conducted on
the entire sample and used to estimate factor scores for the regression models in Phases 2 and 3.
The fit for this model was slightly lower than the previous models (CFI=0.94, TLI=0.94,
RMSEA=0.05, SRMR=0.07); however, it is important to consider that this model was exceedingly
large with 10 latent constructs measured using 41 indicators.
Phase 2
The next phase of the analysis examined how the antecedents of legitimacy impact the
different dimensions of legitimacy identified in the CFA. Accordingly, the dimensions of
legitimacy were regressed on procedural justice, distributive justice, police effectiveness, political
ideology, political identity, age, gender, race, and education level (Table 2).
[Insert Table 2 About Here]
As expected, procedural justice, distributive justice, and police effectiveness were
significantly related to trust in the police and obligation to obey, with procedural justice having
the strongest effect. Interestingly, the coefficient for distributive justice on obligation to obey was
in the opposite direction of what we expected – with individuals perceiving greater injustice more
likely to perceive an obligation to obey the police (β = -0.09). However, the effect was quite small
in comparison to procedural justice. Turning to the new measure of traditional authority, the
findings differed in subtle but meaningful ways. Procedural justice remained the strongest
predictor of traditional authority (β = 0.71), but the effect of distributive justice was negligible (β
= 0.01). Still, the police effectiveness had a strong and meaningful association with traditional
authority (β = 0.10). While the dimensions of legitimacy are quite similar in their antecedents –
procedural justice is the strongest predictor of all three dimensions – they do vary in some ways.
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For example, perceptions of the police as a traditional authority are strongly related to political
identification.
Phase 3
In the final phase of the analysis, we considered the practical implications of differing
measures of legitimacy using empowerment as an example. For the first step in this phase, general
police empowerment was regressed on trust in the police, obligation to obey, and each of the
variables included in Table 2 (see Model 1, Table 3). Then, traditional authority was introduced
into the analysis to determine if measuring legitimacy along the different dimensions changed any
conclusions that would have been previously drawn about empowerment (see Model 2, Table 3).
[Insert Table 3 About Here]
The models operated as expected. In Model 1, trust in the police (β = 0.24), obligation to
obey (β = 0.19), and procedural justice (β = 0.40) were strong predictors of police empowerment,
consistent with prior literature. When traditional authority was included in Model 2, it became the
strongest predictor of police empowerment (β = 0.42) with trust in the police (β = 0.07) and
obligation to obey (β = 0.07) reduced to non-significance. Importantly, however, by looking at the
small changes in the R-squared values from the model (Model 1: 0.67, Model 2: 0.69) we can tell
that because all three measures are tapping into the same higher-order construct of legitimacy
(consistent with the CFA), we gained little additional explanatory power from adding the measure
of traditional authority to the model.12 That is, when assessing global empowerment of the police,
studies that have only included trust in the police and obligation to obey in their models have likely

12

This is likely the result of what MacKinnon and colleagues (2000) call a confounding relationship. That is, the
relationship between rational legitimacy and empowerment is confounded when traditional legitimacy is added to
the model because rational legitimacy and traditional legitimacy are related constructs.
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reached the same conclusion that we draw here, that Sunshine and Tyler’s (2003) empowerment
hypothesis is supported.
Next, we replicated the analyses in Models 1 and 2 using a situational measure of police
empowerment (i.e., to investigate a hypothetical police shooting) as the dependent variable. Here
again, we split the analysis into two models (with and without the traditional authority measure).
When considering only rational legitimacy (Model 3), the model resembled the global
empowerment models with few exceptions. Both trust (β = 0.13) and obligation to obey (β = 0.21)
were positively associated with empowerment of the police to investigate a police shooting.
Procedural justice (β = 0.32) was also related to empowerment. Differences between the global
empowerment and situational empowerment models can be seen in the addition of the two political
variables being significant (ideology, β = -0.09; identification, β = 0.08), both in the direction that
more liberal respondents were less likely to empower the police. Finally, police effectiveness (β =
0.21) is strongly related to empowerment, suggesting that if citizens think the police are effective
at investigating crime, they are more likely to empower them to investigate a police shooting.
Adding traditional legitimacy to the equation (Model 4) substantially altered the results.
First, the standardized coefficient for traditional authority (β = 0.68) was the largest in the model.
Obligation to obey was no longer significantly related to empowerment, and trust in the police (β
= -0.16) became negatively related to empowerment. In other words, when traditional authority
was included in the equation, having high levels of normative trust in the police was related to
being less likely to empower the police to investigate a police shooting. Procedural justice (β =
0.14) and distributive justice (β = 0.06) were both related to empowerment in the expected
direction, though the coefficients were relatively small. Again, police effectiveness (β = 0.21) had
a strong relationship with empowerment. Political ideology (β = -0.09) was negatively associated
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with empowerment such that individuals with more liberal ideologies were less likely to empower
the police. Perhaps the most interesting result of adding traditional authority to this equation,
however, was the change in the proportion of variance explained. When considering empowerment
in the hypothetical scenario, adding traditional authority increased the R-squared for the model
from 0.64 to 0.70 – three times the shift from 0.67 to 0.69 in the global empowerment models.
Consistent with our theoretical expectations, this suggests that our measure of traditional authority
taps into a broader construct of legitimacy and operates similar to measures of rational legitimacy,
(such as trust and obligation to obey) when the police operate within the bounds of their authority.
When police approach or exceed the bounds of their authority, traditional authority adds additional
explanatory power.
Discussion
The notion of legitimacy is at the heart of policing in the 21st Century, in no small part
because of the sheer volume of research pointing to its beneficial effects (Mazerolle et al., 2013;
Walters & Bolger, 2019). The phrase “police legitimacy” returns over 8,900 hits on Google
Scholar since Tom Tyler’s book Why People Obey the Law was first published in 1990.13 It should
perhaps come as no surprise, then, that President Obama’s Task Force on Policing in the 21st
Century suggested “building trust and legitimacy” as its first of six pillars of reform, using the
term “legitimacy” 53 times throughout its final report. Yet curiously—and despite its widespread
popularity among criminologists, reformers, and politicians—we lack consensus regarding what it
means (Jackson & Bradford, 2019; Posch et al., 2020; Tankebe, 2013; Tyler, 2004).
With this study, we sought to expand the popular conceptualization of legitimacy. We
argued that much of the extant literature focuses exclusively on Weber’s (1947) conceptualization
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of rational legitimacy or legitimacy based on the exercise of power according to normative rules.
When studying outcomes that likely have a bounded relationship with legitimacy, such as
empowering police to engage in various discretionary activities, scholars should consider Weber’s
conceptualization of traditional legitimacy in addition to rational-legal legitimacy. To test this
argument, we developed a measure of traditional legitimacy, compared it to existing measures of
police legitimacy, and then assessed its relationship with police empowerment.
These tests demonstrated that traditional legitimacy is distinct from previous measures of
legitimacy including trust in and obligation to obey the police, but that all three measures tap into
a common, larger, higher-order construct of police legitimacy. In predicting police legitimacy,
procedural justice emerged as the strongest predictor regardless of the specific measure or
conceptualization, further supporting Tyler’s (2006b) theory of procedural justice and legitimacy.
However, the observed relationship between procedural justice and the traditional authority
measure stood at odds with the argument that legitimation as a traditional authority is not based
on the use of fair or legal processes. Lest we dismiss this concept too soon, this finding could be
the result of reverse causality: individuals come into encounters with pre-existing attitudes toward
the police which in turn influence their perceptions of procedural fairness in the encounter (Nagin
& Telep, 2017; Pickett, Nix, & Roche, 2018). Thus, it is possible that traditional legitimacy is
garnered through a socialization process that recognizes the long-standing position of police in
society, and those who legitimate the police in this way are in turn more likely to view the police
as procedurally fair. This possibility should be explored in future research using designs that can
establish temporal order of perceptions. Relatedly, future research should also consider the
potential sources of traditional authority. While traditional authority is based on “long standing
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custom,” individuals are likely socialized into recognizing this “long standing custom” by teachers,
parents, peers, and others.
Returning to the results of our analyses, there were also some unique predictors of each
measure of legitimacy with a liberal political ideology predicting greater trust in the police and
conservative political identification predicting obligation to obey, and to a greater extent,
traditional legitimacy. This provides needed theoretical context to both liberal and conservative
political movements such as Black Lives Matter, Defund the Police, and Back the Blue. It seems
possible that all three groups may consider the police “legitimate” but vary in how they legitimate
the police. Liberal movements such as Black Lives Matter and Defund the Police legitimate the
police using rational-legal legitimacy, which is compromised when the police behave unfairly or
overstep their legal authority. Conservative movements such as Back the Blue legitimate the police
through a focus on the obligation to obey and a recognition of the police as a traditional authority
that does not put as much emphasis on the fairness or legality of police behavior.
In examining the empowerment hypothesis generally, our measures replicate the findings
of previous studies (Gerber & Jackson, 2017; Metcalfe & Hodge, 2018; Moule, Burruss, et al.,
2019; Moule, Fox, et al., 2019). Each measure of legitimacy was associated with global police
empowerment. Furthermore, omitting traditional legitimacy and predicting global empowerment
using only obligation to obey and trust in the police had little negative consequence as the
estimated proportion of variance explained was similar. This further confirms that trust in the
police, obligation to obey, and traditional legitimacy tap into the same general construct of police
legitimacy. This finding also gives us greater confidence in prior work that indicates legitimacy is
related to empowerment, regardless of the conceptualization and operationalization used.

24

Finally, in examining a specific scenario where a police department engaged in
controversial behavior – specifically, investigating their own police shooting – traditional
legitimacy was a powerful predictor of empowerment, while measures of rational legitimacy faded
in importance. While both trust and obligation to obey positively predicted empowerment in the
absence of a traditional authority measure, the direction of the trust coefficient flipped to negative
and obligation to obey became non-significant when the traditional authority measure was
included. Furthermore, when the traditional authority measure was included, the explanatory
power of the model was greatly improved. These findings suggest that assessing the type of
legitimacy is important when considering the relationship between legitimacy and its outcomes in
a situation where police may be overstepping their authority in the eyes of the public.
Practically speaking, this again helps to explain divided political reactions to officerinvolved shootings. As noted above, individuals with more liberal ideologies tend to legitimate the
police through rational means, which has a bounded relationship on empowerment when police
seemingly overstep their legal authority. Contrastingly, individuals identifying as more politically
conservative scored higher on our traditional legitimacy index, which has an unbounded
relationship on empowerment – predicting empowerment even when police act in ways that might
overstep their legal authority. It makes sense then, that conservatives and liberals react differently
to the police’s claim to authority when the police engage in controversial or illegal behavior.
Our study, as is true of all studies, is not without its limitations. First, the data came from
an online convenience sample, which may limit its generalizability. Still, we see great value in
developing and testing scales that measure traditional legitimacy, and our study is a first step
toward that goal. Scholars should continue to hone measures of traditional legitimacy in future
studies to test the generalizability of the construct. Furthermore, the use of an online convenience
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sample to examine police empowerment is consistent with prior studies in this area (Moule,
Burruss, et al., 2019; Moule, Fox, et al., 2019) and has been shown in other research to be
generalizable to population-based samples (Mullinix et al., 2015). Future research should therefore
consider exploring the empowerment hypothesis through other methodologies.
Second, the data used in this study was cross-sectional and, therefore, unable to establish
causality. This limitation becomes particularly salient in considering the relationship between
traditional legitimacy and procedural fairness. It is our assertion that traditional authority and
procedural justice are related because individuals who are socialized into legitimating the police
through traditional means will be more likely to view their actions as procedurally fair, but the
cross-sectional nature of our study is unable to test this assertion. Still, as noted earlier, this is the
first paper to empirically study the measure of traditional authority in policing and research into
the empowerment hypothesis remains in its infancy so useful information can be gleaned from
testing cross-sectional data.
Third, this paper focused on public perceptions of police empowerment as one outcome of
legitimacy where Weber’s facets may be particularly salient. Future research should consider
whether other outcomes, such as cooperation, compliance, or even support for police funding also
experience similar relationships. Additionally, it is important to recognize that public perceptions
of police empowerment are distinct from and may not accurately reflect police feelings of
empowerment (see e.g., Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012). If true, empowerment may have limited
impact on actual police behaviors. This possibility should also be explored in future research.
Fourth, we focused on traditional and rational-legal authority, to the exclusion of
charismatic legitimacy (Weber, 1947). Future studies should consider the extent that citizens
legitimate police executives or other “institutional sovereigns” (Crank & Langworthy, 1992) based
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on charisma, and whether such perceptions square with their broader perceptions of policing’s
institutional legitimacy. We could easily foresee scenarios where loyalty to a charismatic figure
could moderate effects like the ones we observed here (i.e., the effect of traditional authority on
police empowerment). For example, this may have been the case on January 6, 2021, when Donald
Trump supporters stormed the U.S. Capitol while carrying “Blue Lives Matter” flags, only to
assault police officers who stood in their way.
Furthermore, we would also like to acknowledge that the measures utilized here are far
from perfect and represent a first step in assessing a previously understudied concept – traditional
authority. We considered measures of trust and obligation to obey to be representative of rationallegal authority because these measures have been used by legitimacy scholars in the past when
operating under the rational-legal framework of procedural justice theory (i.e., legitimacy is
derived through the use of fair and legal procedures). As one thoughtful reviewer noted, however,
there is some logical overlap between obligation to obey and the concept of traditional authority.
This is further underscored by the empirical findings that obligation to obey did not neatly fit with
the trust measures or the traditional authority measure in factor analysis. We offer no conclusive
verdict on this measurement issue then, but rather encourage additional research in this area to
consider the role that traditional authority may play in the legitimation of policing.
Finally, the examination of controversial police behavior used in this study is not actually
illegal. However, readers should keep in mind that when Weber discusses overstepping legal
authority, he is not speaking from a lawyer’s point of view regarding what is legal in fact, but from
a social psychologist’s point of view regarding what is legal in perception. In other words, if
individuals believe that officers are overstepping their constitutionally granted authority, the actual
legality of the act is irrelevant (Stoughton et al., 2020). Still, exploring empowerment of the police
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in other questionable situations, especially legally precarious tactics such as SQF, should be
examined in future studies.
In the end, we hope this study can serve as a steppingstone to future studies of legitimacy
in the criminal justice system. While the findings here show that the omission of measures of
traditional legitimacy does not invalidate a large body of literature demonstrating a link between
legitimacy and a wide variety of important outcomes, we believe that incorporating considerations
of traditional legitimacy in future studies of the criminal justice system will help to provide nuance
to the limitations of legitimacy. There are a variety of situations – such as protest policing or even
certain aspects of judicial decision-making – in which the absence of a traditional authority
measure may result in scholars misunderstanding a nuanced relationship between legitimacy and
its outcomes.
It is critical for scholars to consider the limitations of legitimacy in explaining inappropriate
police behaviors. While positive police-community relations are a desirable goal for police
departments, empowering the police to engage in questionable behaviors is not. The bounded
nature of legal-rational legitimacy demonstrates that scholars should not be concerned that
increased procedural fairness will encourage individuals to empower the police to engage in
questionable behavior (see e.g., Vitale 2017). On the other hand, blind loyalty to the police
demonstrated via traditional legitimacy can be dangerous.
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Figure 1. Feedback Loop for Empowerment and
Stop and Frisk
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Figure 2. Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Legitimacy Items
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Analytic Sample (N=701)
N
%
Age
Mean = 46.07 (SD = 17.26)
Race/Ethnicity
White (Non-Hispanic)
Black (Non-Hispanic)
Hispanic
Other

438
93
117
53

62.48
13.27
16.69
7.56

Gender
Female
Male

363
338

51.78
48.22

Education
Less than a HS Diploma
HS Diploma
Some college
Associate’s Degree
Bachelor’s Degree
Graduate Degree

23
211
201
92
137
66

3.15
28.90
27.53
12.60
18.77
9.04

Note: Descriptives for latent constructs are not included because they were standardized when constructed by the
confirmatory factor analysis. Thus, all means are 0 and all standard deviations are 1.
Quotas ensured that the sample matched Census estimates of the US population on age, race/ethnicity, and
gender. Examining the education descriptives reveals that the sample also closely reflected Census estimates for
HS Diploma, Associate’s Degree, Bachelor’s Degree, and Graduate Degree. Substantially fewer individuals had
“Less than a HS Diploma” and substantially more individuals had “Some college.” We do not anticipate that
this results in any issues with the analysis as education was largely unrelated to the key outcomes in Tables 2 and
3.
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Table 2. OLS Regression Predicting Dimensions of Legitimacy
Variable
Trust in the Police
b
β
S.E.
Procedural Justice
0.676**
0.678
0.051
Distributive Justice
0.113**
0.110
0.027
Police Effectiveness
0.181**
0.176
0.051
Political Ideology
0.105**
0.100
0.031
Political Identification
0.032
0.030
0.029
Age
0.003*
0.046
0.001
Male
0.024
0.012
0.047
Black
0.006
0.002
0.070
Hispanic
-0.056
-0.021
0.052
Other
-0.104
-0.028
0.089
Education
0.022
0.031
0.014
F-Test
R-Squared
N

158.78**
0.728
701

Obligation to Obey
b
β
S.E.
0.502**
0.533
0.059
-0.090** -0.094
0.032
0.099^
0.101
0.059
-0.019
-0.019
0.038
0.075*
0.077
0.036
0.004*
0.071
0.002
-0.021
-0.011
0.058
-0.010
-0.004
0.090
-0.105
-0.042
0.071
-0.262*
-0.075
0.131
0.039*
0.058
0.019

Traditional Authority
b
β
S.E.
0.686**
0.706
0.047
0.011
0.011
0.025
0.101*
0.101
0.046
0.045
0.044
0.029
0.180**
0.178
0.028
0.001
0.020
0.001
-0.030
-0.016
0.043
-0.081
-0.029
0.074
-0.034
-0.014
0.048
-0.112
-0.031
0.087
0.007
0.011
0.014

48.15**
0.473
701

158.54**
0.737
701

Note: Entries are unstandardized partial regression coefficients (b), standardized partial regression coefficients (β), and robust standard errors (S.E.).
^p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, two-tailed test
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Table 3. OLS Regressions predicting Global and Situational Empowerment
DV: Global Empowerment
Model 1
Variable
Trust in Police
Obligation to Obey
Traditional Authority
Procedural Justice
Distributive Justice
Police Effectiveness
Political Ideology
Political Identification
Police Information
Witness Present
Age
Male
Black
Hispanic
Other
Education

b
0.233**
0.192**
-0.383**
0.022
0.074
0.028
0.063^
---0.005**
0.058
0.019
0.072
0.037
-0.005

β
0.243
0.189
-0.400
0.022
0.075
0.027
0.063
---0.093
0.031
0.007
0.029
0.010
-0.076

DV: OIS Empowerment
Model 2

S.E.
0.056
0.036
-0.059
0.029
0.052
0.033
0.032
--0.001
0.048
0.076
0.062
0.075
0.015

b
0.062
0.073^
0.410**
0.277**
0.026
0.076
0.025
0.003
---0.005**
0.072
0.052
0.064
0.033
0.000

β
0.065
0.071
0.416
0.289
0.026
0.076
0.024
0.003
---0.085
0.039
0.019
0.026
0.009
0.000

Model 3
S.E.
0.065
0.038
0.068
0.058
0.029
0.050
0.032
0.032
--0.001
0.047
0.071
0.061
0.072
0.014

b
0.116*
0.200**
-0.294**
0.048^
0.196**
-0.083**
0.080*
0.049
-0.043
-0.004**
0.030
0.012
0.041
-0.032
0.000

β
0.126
0.206
-0.321
0.051
0.207
-0.085
0.084
0.028
-0.024
-0.079
0.017
0.005
0.017
-0.010
0.001

Model 4
S.E.
0.052
0.037
-0.054
0.028
0.050
0.031
0.031
0.042
0.041
0.001
0.046
0.072
0.061
0.087
0.014

b
-0.151**
0.014
0.639**
0.128*
0.055*
0.199**
-0.087**
-0.013
0.060
-0.061
-0.003**
0.052
0.063
0.030
-0.037
0.009

β
-0.164
0.014
0.678
0.140
0.058
0.210
-0.090
-0.013
0.033
-0.034
-0.065
0.029
0.024
0.013
-0.011
0.014

S.E.
0.056
0.035
0.057
0.051
0.025
0.046
0.029
0.028
0.038
0.037
0.001
0.042
0.061
0.057
0.077
0.013

F-Test
93.42**
109.28**
75.56**
99.33**
R-Squared
0.671
0.695
0.641
0.703
N
701
701
701
701
Note: Entries are unstandardized partial regression coefficients (b), standardized partial regression coefficients (β), and robust standard errors (S.E.).
^p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, two-tailed test.
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